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______________________________________________________________________________
ISSUE: IS THE ECCC’S SUPREME COURT CHAMBER’S CONCEPTION OF A COMMON CRIMINAL PLAN
IN THE CASE 002/01 APPEAL JUDGMENT SUPPORTED BY CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW?
SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSING THE ARGUMENTS SURROUNDING THE SUPREME COURT CHAMBER’S
REJECTION OF THE EXISTENCE OF JCE3 AND WHETHER POST WORLD WAR II JURISPRUDENCE
ESTABLISHES THE EXISTENCE OF JCE3 IN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW.
______________________________________________________________________________
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. ISSUE
This memorandum discusses whether the Supreme Court Chamber in the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’s (ECCC) conception of common
criminal plan liability or joint criminal enterprise liability (JCE) in the Case 002/01
Appeal Judgment is supported by customary international law. Specifically, this
memorandum considers whether the third form of joint criminal enterprise as detailed by
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia existed in customary
international law in the years applicable to ECCC jurisdiction. The post-World War II
jurisprudence is discussed along with the jurisprudence of the other ad hoc tribunals.
B. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
1.

The conception of a common criminal plan as used by the
Supreme Court Chamber is supported by customary
international law in regard to the basic form of joint
criminal enterprise.

Common criminal plan liability exists for crimes committed by defendants that are
part of a common criminal plan or purpose, that have a common criminal intent in
regards to bringing about the common criminal plan. The liability exists regardless of the
person’s role in the common criminal plan as well as the person’s lack of participation in
the physical criminal act. The case law post-World War II as well as governing statutes
and rules at the time inexplicably demonstrates the existence of the basic form of joint
6

criminal enterprise liability.

2.

The conception of a common criminal plan as used by the
Supreme Court Chamber in regards to rejecting the third
or extended form of joint criminal enterprise is not
supported by customary international law.

The third form of joint criminal enterprise extends individual liability to crimes
committed by part of the group as a result of the common criminal plan but were not
themselves contemplated as part of the plan. Post-World War II jurisprudence supports
the idea that a person can be liable for acts resulting from a common criminal plan even
though the actual crimes were not contemplated, the crimes were foreseeable from such a
plan, and the person involved in the common criminal plan assumes the risk of the crime.
Additionally, analyses from other ad hoc tribunals to determine the acceptability of the
various forms of joint criminal enterprise has resulted in the adoption of the third form of
joint criminal enterprise. The post-World War II jurisprudence along with the stances of
the other international ad hoc tribunals support the existence of the third form of joint
criminal enterprise liability in customary international law.
3.

The Supreme Court Chamber did not put enough weight
on the post-World War II jurisprudence in support of the
existence of the third form of joint criminal enterprise
along with the position of the ad hoc tribunals.

Cases making up the post-World War II jurisprudence along with the stances taken
by the ad hoc tribunals support the existence of JCE3 in customary international law.
The Supreme Court Chamber was skeptical about the cases showing the existence of
7

JCE3; however, they were enough to demonstrate the existence of JCE3. Additionally,
the Supreme Court Chamber did not put much weight on the adoption of JCE3 by the
other tribunals since their jurisdiction is based on crimes happening years after those
under the jurisdiction of the ECCC even though no significant change in customary
international law would have occurred before the jurisdiction for crimes committed in the
other tribunals comes into play to justify JCE3 existing in the other tribunals but not at
the ECCC.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. THE KHMER ROUGE
The Khmer Rouge began as a guerrilla group in the jungles of Cambodia with
communist ideas.1 When the Cambodian leader was deposed in a military coup, he
leaned on the Khmer Rouge for support in 1970.2 However, the regime really came into
power on April 17, 1975.3 When Pol Pot seized power for the Khmer Rouge by
capturing the capital of Phnom Penh, the Khmer Rouge began its plan for the Cambodian
nation, which became known as the Democratic Republic of Kampuchea. 4
After the Khmer Rouge took over a city, population movements were enforced.
All populations within the captured cities were forced to move to camps in the
1

Dan Fletcher, The Khmer Rouge, Time Online (Feb. 17, 2009)
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1879785,00.html [Electronic copy provided in accompanying
USB flash drive at Source 3].
2
Id.
3
ECCC At A Glance, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (April 2014),
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/ECCC%20at%20a%20Glance%20-%20EN%20%20April%202014_FINAL.pdf [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 4].
4
Dan Fletcher, The Khmer Rouge, Time Online (Feb. 17, 2009)
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1879785,00.html [Electronic copy provided in accompanying
USB flash drive at Source 3].
8

countryside.5 Pol Pot and his fellow leaders of the Khmer Rouge wanted to create a
complete agrarian society without social institutions like education, technology, or
religion.6 Exterminations of those that would most go against the this ideal society
began.7 Businessman, other intellectuals, Buddhists, and foreigners were all a threat to
this society.8 Around two million people perished due to torture, starvation, force labor,
and execution during the almost 4 years that the Khmer Rouge regime was in power.9 It
was not until 1979 that the Vietnamese invaded and forced the Khmer Rouge back to the
jungles where they began. 10
B. ECCC
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia is a Cambodian court
with United Nations (UN) international participation. The Cambodian national
legislature passed a law on the establishment of the ECCC in 2001, but an agreement
between the United Nations and the government of Cambodia was not passed until
2003.11 The ECCC was set up and staffed in 2006, but it was not until 2007 that the
ECCC was fully operational.12 The court is staffed with national as well as international
judges, prosecutors, and support staff members.13 The court is located in Cambodia at

5

Id.
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
ECCC At A Glance, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (Apr. 2014)
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/ECCC%20at%20a%20Glance%20-%20EN%20%20April%202014_FINAL.pdf [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 4].
12
Id.
13
Id.
6
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the insistence of the Cambodian government even though the United Nations originally
wanted it located outside of Cambodia to be run like the other international ad hoc
tribunals.14
The ECCC was established with the jurisdiction to try crimes under national as
well as international law making it a hybrid ad hoc tribunal.15 It has been established to
try serious crimes committed by during the Khmer Rouge or Democratic Kampuchea
regime in Cambodia from April 17, 1975 until January 6, 1979.16 ECCC jurisdiction is
limited to the senior leaders that are most responsible for the crimes committed during the
Khmer Rouge regime; however, the types of crimes under its jurisdiction to limited to a
set number.17
The ECCC is made up of a Pre-Trial Chamber, a Trial Chamber, and a Supreme
Court Chamber. The Pre-Trial Chamber hears any motions and appeals while the case is
still being investigated.18 Usually it is hearing these motions and appeals against orders
given by the Co-Investigating Judges.19 Once the case is outside of the investigation
stage, the case is sent to trial in front of the Trial Chamber.20 The Trial Chamber renders
a verdict on the guilt or innocence of the parties for the crimes they are charged with.21

14

Id.
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
15

18

Judicial
Chambers,
Extraordinary
Chambers
in
the
Courts
of
Cambodia
(2018)
https://eccc.gov.kh/en/organs/judicial-chambers [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at
Source 6].
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
10

Finally, the Supreme Court Chamber will hear appeals of the Trial Chambers decisions.22
The court has dealt or is still dealing with the various stages regarding four cases since its
start in 2007.23
C. CASE 002/01
1.

BACKGROUND

Case 002 started to try four leaders of the Khmer Rouge, but two are not deceased
and have since been taken off of the case.24 The case is against Nuon Chea, who was the
former Chairman of the Democratic Kampuchea National Assembly and Deputy
Secretary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, and Khieu Samphan, the former Head
of State of Democratic Kampuchea.25 They are together the Accused. The Accused are
charged with crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of
1949; they were also charged with genocide against the Muslim Cham and the
Vietnamese.26 Case 002 was separated into two trials to deal with segments of the
indictments that have to do with different parts of the atrocities committed during the
Khmer Rouge.27
Case 002/01 focuses on crimes against humanity committed during the population
movements from Phnom Penh among other cities along with the execution of Khmer

22

Id.
Introduction to the ECCC, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (2018)
https://eccc.gov.kh/en/introduction-eccc [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 5].
24
Case 002, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (2018) https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/case/topic/119
[Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 1].
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
11
23

Republic solders at the Toul Po Chrey execution site. 28 This part of the case also delved
into the regime policies that will be relevant for not only this segment of Case 002 but
also the second piece as well. 29
The judgment of the Trial Chamber was given on August 7, 2014.30 The Accused
were found guilty of crimes against humanity and sentenced to life imprisonment.31 The
Trial Chamber also rejected the third form of joint criminal enterprise as a means for
individual liability in its judgment.32 The Accused appealed to the Supreme Court
Chamber.33 The Supreme Court Chamber rendered its decision on November 23, 2016.34
2. SUPREME COURT CHAMBER’S CONCEPTION OF JCE
Since the senior members being tried in the case did not physically commit the
criminal acts being tried as crimes against humanity, the court needed to decide how to
determine the senior member’s individual criminal liability. The senior members were
being charged with these crimes based on common criminal plan or joint criminal
enterprise liability. However, what all encompasses common criminal plan liability?
Previously, the Pre-Trial Chamber had rejected the third extended from of joint criminal
enterprise liability.35 However, they did accept the first or basic form of joint criminal

28

Id.
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Appeal Judgment, Case File 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/SC 002/01, at 1, Nov. 23, 2016,
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/2016-1215%2010:27/161202%20Case%20002%2001%20Appeal%20Judgement_EN_web%20version.pdf [Electronic copy
provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 8].
35
Id. at 347.
12
29

enterprise along with the second form of JCE.36 On appeal, the Supreme Court Chamber
had to revisit these ideas of what joint criminal enterprise liability entails in customary
international law from 1975 until 1979. 37
The Accused challenged the existence of liability under a common purpose or plan
when the accused may not have performed any element of the actus reus of the crime but
simply contributed to the common criminal plan.38 Meaning, the Accused argues that
individual liability for a joint venture at the time is “limited to joint contributions to
specific criminal conduct with shared criminal intent.”39 However, the Supreme Court
Chamber decided based on post-World War II case law and jurisprudence that liability
will exist when a common criminal plan is made up or “encompasses” that of a criminal
intent and where the common purpose must amount to or involve the commission of a
crime.40 It cannot merely result in the commission of the crime.41 The actus reus
amounts to just some contribution to the implementation of the common criminal plan.42
They themselves do not need to be the involved in the carrying of the actual criminal
acts. Finally, the mens rea regarding the criminal acts involve desire, knowledge, or
indifference to the act occurring to achieve the common plan itself or an objective of it.43
The criminal acts must be contemplated in some way. The Supreme Court Chamber

36

Id.
Id. at 348.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
37
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accepted the basic form of joint criminal enterprise.
However, the Supreme Court Chamber rejected the idea that the criminal act can
just “result” from the common plan. Post-World War II case law and jurisprudence does
not demonstrate the existence of liability for criminal acts that are foreseeable, but just
result from the plan and were not contemplated in regards to the common criminal plan.44
This extended form of joint criminal enterprise does not exist in customary international
law and will not be recognized by the ECCC.45
III.

SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL DISCUSSION

In order to ascertain the whether the third or extended form of joint criminal
enterprise exists in customary international law, the treatment of usage of said JCE must
be reviewed through the lens of post-World War II jurisprudence in addition to how other
international tribunals deal with this type of individual criminal liability.
A. POST-WORLD WAR II JURISPRUDENCE AND
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
TADIĆ CASE CEMENTS THE THREE FORMS OF JOINT
CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE
Foremost, individual criminal liability through the use of common plan liability
1.

became cemented most notably within an international criminal tribunal during the Tadić
case brought before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. In
the process of deciding this case, the court had to make a determination on the existence
and types of joint criminal enterprise that can be used to prove a defendant’s individual

44
45

Id., at 355.
Id.
14

criminal liability.
In the case brought before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, the defendant was being tried for the killings of five people in Jaski after the
attacks on Sivci and Jaski in the territory of Prijedor on June 14, 1992.46 However, the
actual defendant tried for the crimes was not the one that physically killed the five people
that died. 47 The defendant was just a member of a group that worked towards a central
policy of ridding the area of non-Serbs through illegal means to bring about the creation
of a Greater Serbia. 48 The defendant was part of the armed group that went to the
villages of Sivci and Jaski and removed the non-Serbs, beat them, as well as the
separation of the men from the women and children.
In deciding this case, the court had to discuss the legality behind individual
criminal liability when involved in a common purpose where the defendant, himself, did
not commit the actual criminal act.49 The court explained that even though some
members that are part of a common criminal plan do not perpetrate the criminal act, the
involvement of those members are important to helping accomplish the criminal act and
plan as a whole.50 Therefore, the “moral gravity” of those members is often the same as
those participants that physically committed the crimes.51
The court looked at post World War II case law and determined that there are
Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Appeals Chamber Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-A, July 15, 1999 at ¶175. [Electronic
copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 9].
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id. at ¶185.
50
Id. at ¶191.
51
Id.
15
46

three forms of “collective criminality” or joint criminal enterprise.52 The basic form
defined individual liability for a common enterprise as happening when defendants
voluntarily act and have a common design or purpose, and they possess the same criminal
intent.53 In bringing about this common plan, they all possess the same criminal intent
regardless of the different roles the defendants play in the common design and intend the
result.54
The second form defined individual liability for a joint criminal enterprise as
happening with running a concentration camp because it has an institutional framework.55
Liability occurs when defendants work within an organized system that has a purpose to
mistreat prisoners or detainees and commit various crimes, know and are aware of the
system, and participate in enforcing said system.56 While this is its own form of common
plan liability, it can been seen as “variant of the first” form.57
Finally, the court distinguished a third category of common plan liability. The
third form or extended form of joint criminal enterprise defined individual liability as
criminals acts that are out of the common plan but is committed by part of the group, is
natural and foreseeable, and is a consequence of commencing with the common plan.58
The individual, as a part of the group, assumes the risk of the other criminal acts being
committed during the commencement of the common plan by either being indifferent or
52

Id. at ¶195.
Id. at ¶196.
54
Id.
55
Id. at ¶202.
56
Id.
57
Id. at ¶203.
58
Id. at ¶204.
53
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reckless towards said risk.59
2.

NUREMBURG AND CONTROL LAW NO. 10

The Nuremberg Judgment details the charges and conclusions surrounding the
guilt of some of the top-ranking Nazi leaders for the crimes committed by Germany
during World War II. One of the charges made against the defendants involved the
commission of crimes to commit aggressive war during the execution of a common plan.
The Nuremberg Judgment lays out a crime for the participation in a “common plan” and
are responsible for all criminal acts performed “by any person in execution of such
plan.”60 When a leader or someone other member of the group aids in the planning of or
in the action of a common plan to commit one of the laid out crimes like aggressive war,
that leader or members are responsible for the actions taken in pursuit of the common
plan.61 Paul Schmidt, official interpreter of the German Foreign Office, was quoted in
explaining that objectives of the Nazi leadership were very clear and made known;
therefore, the common plan to wage aggressive war was without doubt.62 However, he
went on to explain, “The execution of these basic objectives, however, seemed to be
characterized by improvisation. Each succeeding step was apparently carried out as each
new situation arose, but all consistent with the ultimate objectives mentioned above." 63
From these basic objectives and resulting improvisation to fulfill these objectives, the

59

Id.
International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) Judgment, Oct. 1, 1946 at 56. [Electronic copy provided in
accompanying USB flash drive at Source 11].
61
Id. at 58.
62
Id. at 57.
63
Id.
17
60

defendants were found individually liable for acts committed around Europe by the Nazi
regime. 64
After World War II, the Council Control Law No. 10 was enacted to establish a
legal code to prosecute war criminals other than those dealt with in the Nuremberg
Judgment. 65 Council Control Law No. 10 defines liability when a person “…took a
consenting part therein… or was connected with plans or enterprises involving its
commission or was a member of any organization or group connected with the
commission of any such crime or…” 66
Both under the Nuremberg Judgment and under Council Control Law No. 10,
individual liability was found for criminal acts stemming from the existence of a common
plan pursued by a group such as the Nazi’s in Germany.
3.

EINSATZGRUPPEN CASE

One of the cases tried under Council Control Law No. 10 was the Einsatzgruppen
case against the four groups of Einsatzgruppen. The Einsatzgruppen were formed to go
with the German army into other territories and “exterminate Jews, gypsies, Soviet
officials, and other elements of the civilian population regarded as racially inferior or
politically undesirable.”67 The many defendants were charged with crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and more because they were “principals in, accessories to,
64

Id.
Nuremberg Trials Final Report Appendix D: Control Council Law No. 10, Avalon Project,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt10.asp (last visited Jan. 9, 2018). [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB
flash drive at Source 7].
66
Id.
67
United States v. Ohlendorf, et al., Case No. 9, The Einsatzgruppen Case, Mar. 4, 1949 at 15. [Electronic copy
provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 14].
18
65

ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, were connected with plans and enterprises
involving, and were members of organizations or groups connected with offenses.”68
Even though the defendants did not actually physically participate in many of criminal
acts, they were held individually liable for them being committed. The “accessories” to
the crimes that were connected to the purpose or plan were held liable for the actual
perpetrator’s acts.
While the objective of the Einsatzgruppen was to eliminate Jews and other racially
inferior or politically undesirable people, the four groups were charged with not only
specifically murdering Jews, gypsies, Communists, political officials, and political
activists but also persons in general.69 It follows from the choice of descriptors that many
persons other than those that were part of their primary objective and plan were murdered
by the Einsatzgruppen.
4.

DACHAU CONCENTRATION CAMP CASE

The Dachau Concentration Camp case details the trial of members who ran the
Dachau concentration camp. The defendants were liable for atrocities committed within
the camps because of the common plan for ill-treatment and subjection to atrocities.
More specifically, it is described that “the case for the prosecution was that all the
accused had participated in a common plan to run these camps in a manner so that the
great numbers of prisoners would die or suffer severe injury.”70 Only the forms of such

68

Id.
Id. at 16-21.
70
Dachau Concentration Camp Trial, Case No. 60, Dec. 13, 1945 at 7. [Electronic copy provided in accompany in
19
69

atrocities that this systematic subjection took place varied. Regardless of the varied form
of subjugation and torment, the defendants were found liable for the crimes against
humanity and other international law crimes that happened during the running of the
Dachau concentration camp.
5.

RuSHA CASE

Another trial after Nuremberg was dubbed the RuSHA case. Under this case, there
were fourteen accused under the leadership of Himmler. 71 The common plan for the
organizations under Himmler had the objective of “weakening and eventually destroying
other nations while at the same time strengthening Germany, territorially and
biologically, at the expense of conquered nations.”72
Memos within the Nazi party suggested that kidnapping children of other
countries was a good way to make money and these children could be ‘aryanized.’73
These defendants were convicted based on joint criminal enterprise for actions removed
from the crimes that resulted in kidnapping children as well as other crimes.74
6.

RENOTH CASE

In the Renoth case, defendants were charged at a British Military Tribunal for the
war crime of killing an Allied airman who happened to be a prisoner of war.75 The

USB flash drive at Source 10].
71
United States vs. Ulrich Greifelt, et al., Case No. 8, RuSha Case, Mar. 10, 1948 at 90. [Electronic copy provided
in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 15].
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Trial of Hans Renoth and Three Others, Case No. 68, Jan. 10, 1946 at 76. [Electronic copy provided in
accompanying USB flash drive at Source 13].
20

airman was arrested, beaten, and then shot to death by one of the defendants. The
prosecutor argued liability based on a common plan to commit a war crime where all
defendants were liable for the beating of the airman.76 However, there is speculation
whether three of the defendants who claimed to not have played any physical role were
found guilty based on the common plan theory or if the court decided the defendants
actively took a part in the beating and eventual murder. 77

7.

ESSEN LYNCHING CASE

Another case after World War II involved the murder of three British airmen. In
the Essen Lynching case, a German leader in charge of ordering the escort of the
prisoners supposedly told the guarded escort not to interfere if the crowd tried to molest
them after proclaiming loudly that these airmen should die.78 After the crowd attacks the
prisoners, a German guard shoots and kills the prisoners.79 The German leader was found
guilty for a war crime for the death of the prisoners even though the leader did not
physically kill the prisoners for inciting the scene.
8.

BORKUM ISLAND CASE

Similar to the Essen Lynching case, the Borkum Island case involved the assault
and eventual death of American airmen that became German prisoners. During their
transport, after a decree from the leader in charge to not interfere with civilians assaulting
76

Id.
Id. at 77.
78
Trial Of Erich Heyer And Six Others, Case No. 8, Essen Lynching Case, Dec. 22, 1945 at 90. [Electronic copy
provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 12].
79
Id.
21
77

the prisoners, the prisoners were continually beat and at least one was shot and killed by a
German soldier in the crowd. 80 The objective for the group was to transport the
prisoners while still letting the civilians punish the prisoners for the result of their air
assault.81 The leader was found guilty for his incitement even though he did not
physically assault or kill any of the prisoners.
9.

AD HOC TRIBUNALS AND JCE

Common plan or joint criminal enterprise liability has been discussed in other
international tribunals. As previously mentioned, in the Tadic case, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia accepted the existence of all three types of
joint criminal enterprise liability. In cases after that, the ICTY continues to recognize the
third extended form of joint criminal enterprise. Additionally, in the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, joint criminal enterprise was determined to exist and all
three forms were accepted.82
Moreover, in the Middle East, the Iraqi High Court has accepted all forms of joint
criminal enterprise liability.83 The Iraqi High Court was started with the jurisdiction to
prosecute war crimes or crimes against humanity that occurred by Iraqi nationals between
1968 and 2003 as the Iraqi Special Tribunal before it became the Iraqi High Court with a
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broader jurisdiction in 2005.84
B. JCE IN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
According to the International Law Association, customary international law
doctrine is defined as a one that is “created and sustained by the constant and uniform
practice of states in circumstances that give rise to the legitimate expectation of similar
conduct in the future.”85 Doctrines in customary international law develop as states
follow a rule in a general and consistent way. The International Court of Justice statute
explains things to be examined to determine if a doctrine exists in customary
international law as “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law, in addition to treaties, general principles of law in the major legal systems, judicial
decisions, and the writings of scholars, in its determination of disputes in international
law.”86
Therefore, to determine the existence of the extended form of joint criminal
enterprise, one must look at international custom as well as judicial decisions. Moreover,
post-World War II jurisprudence along with the persuasive authority backing the position
of other international tribunals on the subject will determine whether the third or
extended form of joint criminal enterprise exists in customary international law.
The concept of the extended form of joint criminal enterprise, as previously
described, involves the liability for crimes committed by members of a common plan that
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were not contemplated as part of the plan but are nonetheless a natural and foreseeable
result or outshoot. While post-World War II jurisprudence is clear that the other two
forms of joint criminal enterprise exist in customary international law, there is
controversy over the third form. However, if post-World War II jurisprudence is
analyzed closer along with the persuasive weight of the decisions of other tribunals, the
extended form of joint criminal enterprise does exist in customary international law
during the Khmer Rouge regime.
First, the Nuremberg Judgment explains and proves the existence of liability for
criminal acts committed by members of a common plan in execution of said plan. The
defendants from the Nuremberg Judgment, mostly, were found guilty for some of the
counts of the indictment as a result of crimes committed in execution of the common
plan, and many were contemplated. However, the wording of the judgment clearly
defines liability for “any act” committed “in execution of the common plan.”87 It does
not explicitly say that the acts must be expressly contemplated as part of the plan.
Additionally, the official interpreter of the German Foreign Office was quoted as
explaining that while the Nazi party had a clear general objective and plan, many of the
acts were improvised as things came up. When things are improvised and thought up as
things progress, it follows that they were not necessarily contemplated as part of the
common plan. They became necessary and were natural and foreseeable result from
previous actions, but some of the actions during the Nazi invasions were improvised as
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choices were needed to be made to accomplish the group’s objective. Defendants were
still held liable for actions taken as an improvisation as the war progressed.
Additionally, Council Control Law No. 10 establishing liability when a group has a
connection to the act or they were connected to a plan or enterprise that involved the
commission of the crime. 88 A plan that involved the commission of a crime does not
restrict the encompassing of crimes committed that were natural and foreseeable to the
plan, but not contemplated in the grand scheme, especially if the act furthers the objective
of the plan.
Secondly, in other cases that liability was based on the first or second form of joint
criminal enterprise, the cases also involved aspects of the third form of joint criminal
enterprise with foreseeable results that were not part of the common plan but still
furthered said plan. With the Einsatzgruppen case, while the objective of the
Einsatzgruppen was to eliminate Jews and other racially inferior or politically undesirable
people, the four groups were charged with not only specifically murdering Jews, gypsies,
Communists, political officials, and political activists but also persons in general.89 It
follows from the choice of descriptors that many persons other than those that were part
of their primary objective and plan were murdered by the Einsatzgruppen. When the plan
involves the death of certain types of individuals, it is natural and foreseeable that other
persons may end up being killed as well, but this still furthers the objectives of the group.
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In the Dachau Concentration Camp case, while the liability seems mostly under
the second form of joint criminal enterprise for the systematic ill-treatment policy for the
camp, not all the various ways the prisoners were to suffer were expressly ordered as a
policy for running the camp.90 They were subjected to various forms of crimes that
would be natural and foreseeable to an environment run systematically to make the
prisoners suffer.
Thirdly, post-World War II jurisprudence for a few military tribunal cases for the
assaults and killings of Allied airmen turned prisoners show the existence of the third
form of joint criminal enterprise even though the court does not come out and name the
rationale the follows from the court reaching a guilty verdict. With the Renoth case, the
defendants were part of a group with the goal to hurt those Allied airmen prisoners.
However, the prisoners were in the process of being transferred to a facility, and while
hurting them was the goal, it is logically possible killing the airmen was not the goal, but
it happened anyway. When the goal is to assault someone and the assailants are military
and wielding weapons, the airmen being shot and killed is natural and foreseeable to the
common plan. This is the same for the incitement cases of Essen Lynching and Borkum
Island. The German soldiers had the common plan and understanding that during the
transport, they were not to interfere with civilians punishing the prisoners by assaulting
them and spoke of how they deserved to die.91 However, it was their job to transport

90

Dachau Concentration Camp Trial, Case No. 60, Dec. 13, 1945 at 7. [Electronic copy provided in accompanying
USB flash drive at Source 7].
91
Maximilian Koessler, Borkum Island Tragedy and Trial, 47 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 183, 188
26

them, and a German solider coming out of the crowd and shooting one dead is a natural
and foreseeable result of allowing a crowd to attack a group of prisoners even if it was
not part of the plan.
Finally, while other international courts do not need to follow the precedent set by
other international courts in international law, their decisions do hold persuasive weight.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda both accept the existence of the third form of joint
criminal enterprise. Additionally, the Iraqi High Court also accepts the existence of it.
While these courts were formed to deal with crimes in different decades, the Iraqi High
Court’s jurisdiction encompasses dates that overlap with the Khmer Rouge period, so if it
exists in customary international law for the entire jurisdiction for the Iraqi High Court, it
should for the ECCC. Additionally, while the crimes being dealt with by the ICTY and
the ICTR happen after the crimes being tried by the ECCC, nothing in the international
law that would have changed customary international law to account for it existing after
the 1975 but not during the Khmer Rouge period unless it existed since Nuremberg.
C. SHORTFALLS OF SUPREME COURT CHAMBER’S APPEAL
JUDGMENT

After analyzing post-World War II jurisprudence and the positions of other
international criminal courts, it seems that the third form of joint criminal enterprise does
exist in customary international law during the Khmer Rouge era. However, the Supreme
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Court Chamber of the ECCC in its appeal judgment for Case 002/01 did not come to the
same conclusion. The Supreme Court Chamber upheld the rejection of the third form of
joint criminal enterprise.92 How did the Supreme Court Chamber come to a different
conclusion after reviewing the same evidence? How did they go wrong?
First, the Supreme Court Chamber reviewed the cases that easily fit into JCE1 or
JCE2 as strictly falling into those forms of joint criminal enterprise without giving much
weight to the idea that there were elements that fit into a “resulting” crime without the
court explicitly calling it that. For example, in the Einsatzgruppen case, people were
killed that were not classified as the people that were part of the objective the group was
formed for. Killing those people would be a foreseeable “resulting” crime from the
common plan. Additionally, the improvisation of the Nazi party for some of the crimes
under the Nuremburg Judgment, and improvisation is by nature not planned. It is
foreseeable and natural, but it is not planned when the common plan was made.
Second, the Supreme Court Chamber was skeptical of the cases like Essen
Lynching or Borkum Island or Renoth that would fall into the third form of joint criminal
enterprise because there is not much of a transcript and documentation for the rationale of
the court for those cases.93 However, even though a court does not come out and say
what rule they are following, based on the facts and the result, a rule that fits the
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description of JCE3 applies to those cases. While the objective of the plan was to
transport the captured Allied airmen, they were still going to be allowed to be assaulted
by civilians. However, airmen dying from gunshots from other German soldiers is
foreseeable to the circumstances and feelings towards the prisoners, but it was not a
contemplated part of the plan.
Finally, the Supreme Court Chamber did not put much weight on the positions
taken by other international criminal tribunals. The major criminal tribunals are tasked
with trying crimes that occurred after the crimes being tried during the Khmer Rouge.
Therefore, if the other tribunals are finding the existence of the third form of joint
criminal enterprise in customary international law, it does not necessarily follow that it
existed at the time of the Khmer Rouge. However, the Iraqi High Court has jurisdiction
over with the time period of the Khmer Rouge and it accepts the third form of joint
criminal enterprise. Additionally, even though it is not mandatory to accept the positions
of other tribunals, there is not significant development in international law through cases
that other tribunals could look at that did not exist right after World War II.
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